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THE BROKER'S RIGHT TO A COMMISSION WHEN
THE SALE IS CONSUMMATED AFTER
THE BROKERAGE CONTRACT HAS
BEEN TERMINATED
INTRODUCTION
IN ORDER TO PROCEED expeditiously with the subject-matter of this
article, it must be assumed that the reader understands the re-
quirements necessary for a broker to be entitled to a commission
prior to the termination of his contract. These requirements, i.e.,
procuring cause, and ready, willing and able buyer, have been
discussed in the immediately preceding articles of this volume.
Frequently after a broker has begun negotiations with a pros-
pective purchaser, his contract of employment as agent becomes
terminated, and a sale of the property is consummated by the prin-
cipal after termination. The question then arises as to whether the
broker may collect a commission upon the sale. For convenience,
the answer to this question will be divided into five general cate-
gories-the general rule; the view more favorable to the broker;
effect of the manner of termination; waiver or bad faith by the
owner; and the use of particular brokerage contracts.
GENERAL RULE
As a general rule, in the absence of waiver, fraud or fault of
the owner, a broker is not entitled to a commission unless he has
fulfilled his part of the agency contract within the time limitation
of the contract or an extension thereof granted by the principal.'
If no time is specified in the contract, performance must take place
within a "reasonable time."'2 It is felt that the owner has a right
0 The author wishes to acknowledge the efforts of Assistant Professor Ralph L. Brill,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, who aided in the preparation of this article.
1 Groome v. Freyn, 374 Ill. 113, 28 N.E.2d 274 (1940); Morgan v. Meister, 346 Ill.
App. 577, 105 N.E.2d 775 (2d Dist. 1952) (abstr.); Hunt v. Judd, 225 Ill. App. 395 (3d Dist.
1922); Carroll v. Leafgreen, 170 Ill. App. 328 (1st Dist. 1912); Hoffman v. Boomer, 40 Ill.
App. 231 (1st Dist. 1891); Reedy v. Beauchamp, 307 Ky. 409, 211 S.W.2d 393 (1948);
Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 Pac. 153 (1922); Brackett v. Schafer, 41 Wash. 2d 828,
252 P.2d 294 (1953); 2 Restatement (Second), Agency § 446 (1958). Where the time is
limited, "the performance must be within that time; and the broker will not be entitled
to commissions because efforts begun within that time bear fruit after the expiration."
2 Mechem, Agency § 1997 (2d ed. 1914).
2 Clark v. Muir, 298 111. 548, 132 N.E. 193 (1921); Hunt v. Judd, supra note I
(dictum); Stedman v. Richardson, 100 Ky. 79, 37 S.W. 259 (1896).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to stand upon the literal terms of his contract, and if the broker
fails to sell or produce a purchaser within the specified time, the
owner may treat the contract as at an end.3 The owner may then
sell the property to anyone, including a person with whom the
broker had been negotiating before termination, and the recovery
of a commission will generally be denied.4 In such a case, the
broker may not be able to recover a commission even though he
has performed many of the activities which are commonly deemed
to constitute the "procuring cause" of the sale.5
In Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co.,6 a leading decision in this
area, a New York court announced the general rule in these words:
[A] broker is never entitled to commissions for unsuccessful
efforts. The risk of failure is wholly his. The reward comes only
with his success. That is the plain contract and contemplation of
the parties. The broker may devote his time and labor, and expend
his money with ever so much of devotion to the interests of his
employer, and yet if he fails, if without effecting an agreement or
accomplishing a bargain, he abandons his effort, or his authority is
fairly and in good faith terminated, he gains no right to commis-
sions. He loses the labor and effort which were staked upon success.
And in such event it matters not that after his failure, and the
termination of his agency, what he has done proves of use and
benefit to the principal .... He may have introduced to each other
parties who otherwise would never have met; he may have created
impressions which under later and more favorable circumstances
naturally lead to and materially assist in the consummation of a
sale; he may have planted the very seeds from which others reap
the harvest; but all that gives him no claim.7
The requirement of performance within the specified time
has been very strictly enforced in many cases. In an early Kansas
case, s for example, a broker who was authorized to sell within a
8 Loxely v. Studebaker, 75 N.J.L. 599, 68 Ad. 98 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907).
4 Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 Ill. App. 496, 107 N.E.2d 39 (2d Dist. 1952); Barney v.
Yazoo Delta Land Co., 179 Ind. 337, 101 N.E. 96 (1912); Reedy v. Beauchamp, supra note
1; Stedman v. Richardson, supra note 2;
The world is open to the owner to sell to whomever will buy, upon whatever
terms he pleases. No right can thereafter accrue to the broker, express or implied.
Loxely v. Studebaker, supra note 3, at 606, 68 Ad. at 100.
5 Where a sale is completed after the termination of employment the right to
commissions on such sale has been denied in the majority of cases notwithstanding that
the broker was the procuring cause of the sale or had negotiated with the prospect prior
to such termination. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1352 (1953). And see Brackett
v. Schafer, supra note 1, where the lower court found that the sale was the direct result
of interest created by the broker's efforts, and that he was the efficient procuring cause of
the sale, but no commission was granted.
6 83 N.Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441 (1881).
7 Id. at 383, 38 Am. Rep. at 445.
8 Fultz v. Wimer, 34 Kan. 576, 9 Pac. 316 (1886). The court stated:
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two month period took a prospective purchaser out to the prop-
erty, introduced him to the owner, and arranged for a sale. The
purchaser was unable to raise the down payment until after the
broker's agency had expired. The owner then had the broker draw
up a contract of sale for him. However, having failed to make the
sale within the period provided by the contract, the broker was
denied his commission even though the court recognized that he
had been the instrumental factor in consummating the sale.9
To earn a commission, a broker is usually only required to
find a purchaser, not to conclude the sale itself. 10 If a purchaser
who is ready, willing, and able to buy is procured within the
limited period, the broker will be entitled to his commission even
if the sale is not fully consummated and title not conveyed until
after the termination of the agency." However, to insure receiving
the commission the broker must give notice to the owner that he
has procured a purchaser before his authority expires.' 2
[T]he plaintiff [broker] is bound by the special contract; and, to entitle him to
recover, he must show that he complied with his part of the agreement, and
sold the land within two months .... or that he sold the same within the time
to which the contract was extended. Courts can only enforce contracts as the
parties themselves made them. 34 Kan. at 580, 9 Pac. at 318 & 319.
9 Accord, Stedman v. Richardson, 100 Ky. 79, 37 S.W. 259 (1896). In that case
negotiations had taken place between the broker and a prospective buyer, but no sale had
been made. One day after the termination of agency, sale was made to the prospect by
the owner. Held: no recovery. Also accord, Reedy v. Beauchamp, 307 Ky. 409, 211 S.W.2d
393 (1948); Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 Pac. 153 (1922) (sales made two weeks after
agency expired).
In Barney v. Yazoo Delta Land Co., supra note 4, the broker had succeeded in
interesting a prospect, but he declined to purchase at that time. After termination, the
owner sold to that prospect through another broker. It was stated:
If the broker produces a proposed purchaser, but no sale is consummated until
after the broker's commission has expired, when the principal makes the sale in
good faith, the broker is not entitled to his commission. 179 Ind. at 345, 101 N.E.
at 99.
Further, the court said:
After such a revocation the principal is under no further legal obligation to
said broker, and he may grant options to other persons, or even proceed to sell
the same lands to the same person or corporation with whom the broker has
been negotiating a sale and failed; and under such conditions, the first broker
is not entitled to any compensations for his efforts. 179 Ind. at 348, 101 N.E.
at 100.
10 Monroe v. Snow, 131 Ill. 126, 23 N.E. 401 (1890); Fallen v. Ranguth, 253 Ill. App.
328 (1st Dist. 1929); Purgett v. Weinrank, 219 Ill. App. 28 (2d Dist. 1920). Even where the
contract calls for him "to sell" a broker is required only to procure a purchaser, final
consummation of the sale being left to the owner. 2 Mechem, Agency § 2430 (2d ed. 1914).
11 Chandler v. Gaines-Ferguson Realty Co., 145 Ark. 262, 224 S.W. 484 (1920); De La
Cuesta v. Armstrong Holdings Co., 48 Cal. App. 487, 192 Pac. 135 (1920); Sotham v. Kern,
221 Mich. 5, 190 N.W. 744 (1922) (Where the purchaser took an option during the agency
period and exercised it later.); Crowley v. Meyers, 69 N.J.L. 245, 55 Ad. 305 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1903).
12 Des Rivieres v. Sullivan, 247 Mass. 443, 142 N.E. 111 (1924); Igo v. Brinkman, 151
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VIEW MORE FAVORABLE TO THE BROKER
The general rule requiring full performance by the broker
before dissolution of his agency may frequently prove harsh. The
broker may spend much of his time and money trying to find a
purchaser and may succeed in interesting someone. However, if
that person is not ready, willing, and able to buy upon the owner's
terms during the period of the agency, the broker cannot secure
the commission for which he has labored. He may have been the
"procuring" or "efficient" cause of the sale and yet, under the
general rule, receive no commission.
To relieve brokers of the harshness possible under such a
rule, courts in many states, possibly including Illinois, have ap-
plied tests more favorable to the broker in particular cases. In a
leading decision, Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph,13 it was stated:
[W]here the owner receives and appropriates to his own use
the benefit of the efforts of a broker, no sound reason exists why
courts should construe the contract strictly in favor of the owner.
It is held that whenever there is justification for treating the broker
as the procuring cause of the sale, his services are regarded as highly
meritorious, and the law leans to that interpretation of the facts
Minn. 188, 186 N.W. 297 (1922). In McCoy v. Conkwright, 206 Okla. 545, 245 P.2d 89
(1952), the plaintiff had an exclusive agency for twelve months. Sales were made by the
owner after this period to persons who had been procured during the agency period, but
of whom the owner had been given no notice. Recovery was denied. But see, O'Connor
v. Sample, 57 Wis. 243, 15 N.W. 136 (1883), wherein the broker was allowed a reasonable
time after expiration to give notice.
13 50 Wyo. 331, 63 P.2d 1006 (1936). In this case, the court based part of its decision
upon the difference between "special" and ordinary brokerage contracts. An ordinary or
general contract is one in which the broker is required to "find a purchaser within a
certain time, at a price satisfactory to the owner." Id. at 350, 63 P.2d at 1012. See, Bossart
v. Erie Coal Mining Co., 276 Pa. 63, 119 At. 731 (1923), and Walker v. Randall, 85 Pa.
Super 443 (1924), which are both cited with approval in the Owens case. Accord, see
Humphrey v. Knobel, infra note 16. A special contract is one where compensation is
conditional upon specified results within a specified time limit. 2 Restatement (Second),
Agency § 446 (1958).
The court, in Owens, thoroughly discussed the liberal view, and held that whenever
a broker employed under an ordinary brokerage contract is the procuring cause of a
sale, he is entitled to a commission if he induces a person to begin negotiations with his
principal before the contract expires, and the negotiations materialize within a short
period (usually less than six months) after the contract expires. The court also held,
however, that if the contract provides for compensation upon the procurement of a
purchaser within a definite period of time, then it is a special contract, and the broker
is not entitled to his commission unless he has produced a ready, willing, and able buyer
within that time period. Therefore, this case was remanded to the trial court for a
factual determination of whether the contract involved was "special" or ordinary.
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of the case and the acts of the parties which will best secure to the
broker payment of his commissions. 14
This statement clearly reveals the underlying rationale of the
"procuring cause" principle utilized in the liberal view permitting
the recovery of a commission after the brokerage contract has been
terminated.
In Facchina v. Sullivan,'5 the agent advertised the property
and Mr. and Mrs. Weaver responded. Their offer of $35,000 was
rejected by the owner, and his counter-offer of $39,000 was in turn
declined. Shortly thereafter, the owner withdrew the property
from the market, stating that he would try to sell it himself. About
two months later, the Weavers passed by the property, saw that it
was still for sale, met with the defendant, and finally bought the
property for $36,750. It was held that the broker was the procuring
cause of the sale; as such, he was entitled to a commission.
In a recent Nevada case,16 the broker, under a sixty-day exclu-
sive listing, referred a prospect to the principal during the contract
period. The purpose of the referral was to permit the prospect to
negotiate the difference between his offer of $30,000 and the prin-
cipal's asking price of $31,500. These negotiations culminated in
a sale for $30,000 fourteen days after the expiration of the broker-
age contract. The court held that the broker was entitled to his
commission as the procuring cause of the sale.
The more liberal view has apparently been applied in Illinois,
but limited to those cases in which the brokerage contract has been
terminated by the revocation of the principal.17 Thus, in Gleason
14 Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, supra note 13, at 350-51, 63
P.2d at 1012.
15 109 A.2d 581 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1954).
16 Humphrey v. Knobel, 78 Nev. 137, 369 P.2d 872 (1962). In a reversal of the lower
court, the court stated:
The cases seem to agree that where negotiations are still going on, the contract
will remain effective for a reasonable time after its expiration . . . . Although
the trial court made no definite determination whether the contract in question
was a general or special contract, its refusal to adjudge the broker entitled to a
commission was in effect to construe the contract as one recognized in law as a
special contract. In doing so, it made no factual determination in support of such
construction. Id. at 147, 369 P.2d at 877.
In other words, the court held that the facts in the case did not support the finding of a
special brokerage contract, and therefore, it could and did permit recovery of a commission
under the liberal view.
17 Harrison v. Augerson, 115 Ill. App. 226 (2d Dist. 1904); Schuster v. Martin, 45
Il. App. 481 (2d Dist. 1892); Gleason v. McKay, 37 Ill. App. 464 (lst Dist. 1890). The cases
involving termination by revocation will be discussed hereinafter under a separate heading.
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v. McKay, 8 an Illinois court permitted a broker to recover his
commission after the revocation of the brokerage contract by ap-
plying the liberal view. In that case, Thomas Gleason, in behalf
of his wife, placed the property in the hands of a broker to sell.
The broker commenced negotiations with the person who subse-
quently purchased the property from Gleason. Then, Gleason
withdrew the property from sale, and later sold it to the broker's
customer. The court held that the broker was entitled to his com-
mission. The rationale used to permit recovery was that the prin-
cipal cannot, while in the midst of a negotiation which the efforts
of the broker have set in motion, and which results in a sale of the
property, revoke the brokerage contract and thereby deprive the
broker of his commission.
In all cases involving brokerage contracts which have been
terminated by the expiration of the time provisions in the agency
agreement, Illinois courts have refused to apply the liberal view.'9
However, there is one case which must be classified as an exception
to the foregoing statement. In Griswold v. Pierce,20 the broker
had been authorized to sell a farm. He was notified that he would
have only one more week in which to make a sale. Three days later,
he began negotiations with a prospect and continued until the
closing of the deal which was after the expiration of his contract.
The agent recovered his commission. This Illinois court clearly
applied the liberal view to a case involving a contract terminated
by the expiration of time.
The Griswold case has never been specifically overruled; but
the fact that it has been completely ignored in Illinois plus the fact
that a subsequent court in the Third District upheld the general
rule in an expiration of time case, 2' indicates that this holding is not
the present law in Illinois. Also, the Griswold case might be ex-
plained by saying that the owner waived the time limit; the court
did not use waiver, but the facts strongly suggest it.
18 Supra note 17.
19 Groome v. Freyn, 374 II. 113, 28 N.E.2d 274 (1940); Morgan v. Meister, 346 Ill.
App. 577, 105 N.E.2d 775 (2d Dist. 1952) (abstr.); Hunt v. Judd, 225 Ill. App. 395 (3d Dist.
1922); Carroll v. Leafgreen, 170 Ill. App. 328 (1st Dist. 1912); Hoffman v. Boomer, 40 Ill.
App. 231 (lst Dist. 1891). For a discussion of the general rule applicable in these cases,
see text accompanying note I supra.
20 86 Ill. App. 406 (3d Dist. 1899).
21 Hunt v. Judd, 225 Ill. App. 395 (3d Dist. 1922).
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To be the procuring or efficient cause of the sale, under the
liberal view, the broker must originate a series of events which
result in the prime object of the agent's employment without a
break in continuity. 22 Of course, unless there is waiver or culpa-
bility of the owner, the negotiations must have begun prior to the
expiration of the broker's contract. 2 There must be a direct con-
nection between the broker's activities and the sale, and the nego-
tiations must be continuous, although not necessarily uninter-
rupted. Interruptions may occur providing that they do not destroy
the continuity or causal connection between the broker's efforts
and the effectual transaction.24 An owner, who had originally
rejected an offer as unfair and who sells to the same offeror at the
same price five years later without intervening negotiations should
not be required to pay the broker merely because the latter orig-
inally found the purchaser. 25 But if the intervening time is com-
paratively short, the jury can grant the agent his brokerage fee
even though the period of agency has expired, if it determines that
his actions have proximately caused the sale.26
In the Owens case 2 7 the court held that an intervening period
of four or five months between the negotiations and a final accept-
ance would not be of sufficient length to constitute, as a matter of
law, a fatal break in the causal chain in an ordinary brokerage con-
tract. In Cole v. Crump,28 the sale was effected two years after
22 Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, 50 Wyo. 331, 353-56, 63 P.2d
1006, 1013-15 (1936).
23 4 R.C.L. Brokers § 47, p. 306 (1914). But cf. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 49 R.I. 200,
142 At. 142 (1928).
24 Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, supra note 22.
25 Id. at 355, 63 P.2d at 1014.
26 Ibid. There are two legal theories which some courts seem to apply in order to
allow recovery by the broker after his contract has terminated.
(1) Where the broker is the procuring cause of the sale, the seller, by completing the
sale, is estopped to deny that the buyer was ready, willing, and able during the
listing period.
(2) Where the broker is the procuring cause of the sale, there is an implied waiver
by the owner of the provision in the contract which requires the broker to
produce a buyer within the listing period. Both theories are used in Everson
v. Phelps, 104 Ore. 288, 206 Pac. 306 (1922).
In most cases, however, including the Owens case, the courts do not base their holdings
on any particular theory other than the general theory that where a broker is the pro-
curing cause of a sale within a reasonable time after the termination of his agency, he is
entitled to recover his commission. It is submitted that this latter theory reflects "fuzzy"
thinking by the courts which have applied it without further explanation.
27 Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, supra note 22. For a complete
statement of the holding in this case, see note 13 supra.
28 174 Mo. App. 215, 156 S.W. 769 (1913).
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negotiations were begun and four months after the agent's au-
thority had ended. The broker recovered as procuring cause of the
sale though, he was not participating at the time the transaction was
closed. The original effort by the broker had been availed of, con-
tinued, and consummated by the owner; he was therefore obligated
to compensate the broker.
In summary, the liberal view can and should be adopted by
the courts where the broker has been the efficient cause of a sale
which has taken place within a reasonable time after his brokerage
contract has terminated. The appropriate application of this view
will protect the deserving broker and thus prevent grave injustice.
EFFECT OF THE MANNER OF TERMINATION
The manner by which the broker's authority is terminated
may have some bearing upon the court's determination of his right
to a commission. The broker's agency may be terminated in several
ways-by expiration of the time limit provided in the contract it-
self, or by lapse of a reasonable time when no express limit is
provided; through abandonment of efforts by the broker; and as a
result of revocation by the owner.
Expiration
Generally, where the broker's commission is promised in con-
sideration for the production of a ready, willing, and able customer
within a specified time period, no commission is payable to the
broker for producing a prospective customer within the specified
time if the latter does not reach an agreement with the principal
until after the expiration of the time period. The terms of the
agency agreement control, and therefore, the principal's obligation
to pay a commission automatically erids when the specified time
period expires. If the brokerage contract does not express a time
limit, recovery of a commission is denied where a purchaser is not
procured until after the lapse of a reasonable time.2 9 Specific excep-
29 Clark v. Muir, 298 Ill. 548, 132 N.E. 193 (1921); Hunt v. Judd, 225 Ill. App. 395
(3d Dist. 1922); Stedman v. Richardson, 100 Ky. 79, 37 S.W. 259 (1896).
What is a reasonable time for a broker to sell the property depends on the
circumstances. The more expense required of the broker, subdividing, paving
streets, and so forth, the longer the period will be. Some properties are harder
to sell than others, for example, a one-purpose building such as a church. A
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tions to these general rules will be discussed hereinafter under the
topical heading "Waiver and Bad Faith by Owner."
Where the broker's authority ends by the expiration of the
time provisions in the agency agreement, the courts have generally
been strict in their application of the general rule even though the
broker's services prove beneficial to the owner.30
Some courts in particular cases, however, have sought to pre-
vent harsh results and have granted the broker a commission
through application of the "procuring cause" test of the Owens
case. Illustrative of such an application is the case of Wolf v. Casa-
mento.31 The broker interested one Piera in buying the defendant's
house. One month after the broker's authority lapsed, the owner
completed the sale by himself. The court held that the owner, by
continuing negotiations uninterruptedly with the prospect pro-
cured by the broker, became obligated to compensate him for his
services.
In a recent Massachusetts case, 2 the court applied an implied
waiver theory in holding a principal liable for commissions. It was
held that where there were continuing negotiations between the
broker and the ultimate purchaser and the owner failed to give
notice of termination, upon the expiration of the time limit of
the agency contract the time provision was waived and the power
to sell the property remained in the agent.
A bandonment
Where the broker has abandoned his efforts to effectuate a
sale, it is unlikely that he will be able to obtain a commission under
longer period will be allowed in such case than would be true in the case of a
quick-selling item, such as a modem single-family dwelling. Kratovil, Real Estate
Law, 110 (3d ed. 1958).
80 Groome v. Freyn, 374 11. 113, 28 N.E.2d 274 (1940); Oliver v. Sattler, 233 Ill. 536,
84 N.E. 652 (1908). See generally, Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1353, 1391 (1953).
81 185 So. 537 (La. App. 1939). See Viguerie v. Mathes, 10 La. App. 246 (1929). In that
case, the agent produced one Ritchie who agreed to purchase the property within forty-
five days. The sale and conveyance were actually made five months later. The owner
contended that the original agreement with Ritchie was abandoned and the, later sale
in December was a separate and distinct transaction on different terms. Held: the plaintiff
was the procuring cause of the sale. The owner could not avail himself of such services
which eventually inured to his advantage and, by continuing negotiations beyond the
time allowed, relieve himself of his duty to pay for these services.
82 Coan v. Holbrook, 327 Mass. 221, 97 N.E.2d 649 (1951).
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any theory. 88 This would appear to be the case even though a sale
is subsequently made to a person who was originally solicitated by
the broker and who became interested as a result of his efforts.84
Therefore, the only question to be determined is, whether, on the
basis of the facts presented, there was an abandonment of the trans-
action by the claimant so as to preclude his recovery of compensa-
tion for bringing the, parties together.8 5
Whether the broker has abandoned his undertaking is ordi-
narily a question of intention as inferred from the circumstances."
For instance, inactivity for a substantial period of time after nego-
tiations may indicate that the broker has abandoned his efforts
to sell.3 7
However, a mere temporary cessation of activity would not
necessarily be abandonment.8 In an early Illinois case,89 the fact
that negotiations between the broker and the purchaser ended
three months before the deal was closed by another broker was
held to be insufficient evidence of abandonment. In a later Illinois
case, 40 the court stressed the intention of the prospective purchaser
after the cessation of negotiations by the broker. The court stated:
The mere fact that negotiations may have been discontinued
for a short time will not defeat recovery. In order to constitute
abandonment the evidence must not only show the breaking off of
negotiations but also abandonment of all intention by the pur-
chaser of purchasing the property.41
This case seems to require abandonment by the purchaser as well
88 Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 47 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Ill. 1942);
Weisjohn v. Bell, 316 Ill. App. 62, 43 N.E.2d 688 (1st Dist. 1942); West End Dry Goods
Store v. Maun, 133 Ill. App. 544 (1st Dist. 1907); Watts v. Howard & Calkins, 51 Ill. App.
243 (lst Dist. 1893). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1353, 1402 (1953).
34 Chaffee v. Widman, 48 Colo. 34, 108 Pac. 995 (1910); Rheinberger v. Security Life
Ins. Co. of America, supra note 33; Savage v. Stewart, 226 Ill. App. 388 (2d Dist. 1922);
West End Dry Goods Store v. Maun, supra note 33; Watts v. Howard & Calkins, supra
note 33; Mattingly-Lusky Realty Co. v. Camper, 228 Ky. 407, 15 S.W.2d 24 (1929); Rabkin
v. Calhoun, 83 Ohio App. 222, 81 N.E.2d 241 (1948).
85 Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, supra note 33, at 198.
86 The courts examine the objective intent of the broker as manifested by his
activity or inactivity. In Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, supra note 33,
the court gives an excellent review of the Illinois cases in this area. Also, see generally
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 65 (1938).
37 Mammen v. Snodgrass, 13 111. App. 2d 538, 142 N.E.2d 791 (3d Dist. 1957); Mat-
tingly-Lusky Realty Co. v. Camper, supra note 34.
88 2 Mechem, Agency § 2442 (2d ed. 1914).
89 Rigdon v. More, 226 Ill. 382, 80 N.E. 901 (1907).
40 Rasar & Johnson v. Spurling, 176 Ill. App. 349 (3d Dist. 1912).
41 Id. at 351.
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as by the broker; this theory has been advanced in other cases, but
only to the extent that it is necessary to examine the intentions of
all the parties to the transaction in order to conclude whether or
not there has been abandonment by the broker.42
The fact that the broker tried to sell the prospective purchaser
other property after an apparent failure to sell the principal's
property does not necessarily show an intention to abandon. 43 For
example, in Cowan v. Day," the plaintiff had been trying to sell
property to Mrs. Kane for a long period of time. He sent word to
her via a friend that the defendant's property was for sale. Hearing
nothing from her relative to that property, he resumed his efforts
to interest her in other property. Mrs. Kane meanwhile had pur-
chased the defendant's property. The court held the agent was
the procuring cause of the sale. He did not personally introduce
Mrs. Kane to the defendant, show her the property, or even com-
municate with her in person, but she was induced to negotiate
with the defendant through the instrumentality of the broker. No
abandonment was found. All the broker was required to do was to
cause a purchaser for the property to be found and nothing re-
quired him to cease endeavoring to sell other property to her.
In summary, the courts will only preclude a broker's recovery
of his commission where he outwardly manifests an intention to
abandon the brokerage contract. The facts and circumstances of
each case must be examined in order to determine whether the
broker's action or inaction constituted an intention to abandon.
Revocation
Generally, revocation takes place where the principal revokes
the agency contract before the broker performs the services for
which he was employed. Usually, revocation is express, but it is
also accomplished by operation of law. Thus, the death of the
broker automatically revokes the agency.45 The dissolution of a
42 See Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 47 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. I11.
1942).
43 Cowan v. Day, 156 Ill. App. 105 (3d Dist. 1910); La Verde v. Impagliazzo, 125
At. 284 (R.I. 1924). This is also true where the agent continues his attempts to sell to
other prospects. Bloom v. Christiansen, 18 Wash. 2d 137, 138 P.2d 655 (1943).
44 Supra note 43.
45 W. B. Martin & Son v. Lamkin, 188 Ill. App. 431 (1914). Of course, if the agency
is coupled with an interest, this is not true. See note 48 infra.
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partnership terminates an agency contract appointing the partner-
ship.46 Where an owner employs several brokers to sell his real
estate, the sale of the property by the owner in person or by one
of the brokers revokes the agencies of all the brokers immediately,
without notice.47
The question of whether a broker is entitled to his commis-
sion, or at least damages, after revocation by his principal will be
the topic of the following discussion.
The ordinary contract of agency for the sale of real estate is a
unilateral offer and can be prematurely terminated at any time
before it is accepted by the procurement of a purchaser, provided
the revocation is in good faith.48 This is true even if the terms of
the agreement provide for an exclusive agency during a definite
period or where there is an express declaration that the contract
is to be irrevocable. 49 However, notice of the revocation should be
given to the broker and a failure to do so may cause the owner to
be liable for a commission."
In revocation cases, however, courts have not been so reluctant
to permit recovery of a broker's commission as they have been in
expiration and abandonment cases. For example, where the agent's
authority is terminated by revocation, it may be easier for the
courts to find bad faith on the part of the principal.5 Also, even
though there was no finding of bad faith, there have been a num-
ber of cases in Illinois which strongly indicate that the Illinois
46 Schlau v. Enzenbacher, 265 Ill. 626, 107 N.E. 107 (1914). One partner remaining in
the real estate business is not authorized to bind the owner by executing a sale contract
in his own name or in the firm's name.
47 Hunt v. Judd, 225 Ill. App. 395 (3d Dist. 1922). This automatic revocation is an
implied term of the employment because the object of the broker's employment is at-
tained when one of the several brokers procures a ready, willing, and able buyer for the
seller. 2 Mechem, Agency § 2457 (1914).
48 Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 Ill. App. 496, 107 N.E.2d 39 (2d Dist. 1952); Pretzel v.
Anderson, 162 Ill. App. 538 (1st Dist. 1911). Exceptions to this rule are cases where the
agency is coupled with an interest or where consideration is given by the agent for the
inclusion of a time limit. See dicta in cases cited in note 49 infra. See generally, 12 C.J.S.
Brokers § 12 (1938).
49 Walker v. Denison, 86 Ill. 142 (1877); Goetz v. Ochala, 180 1il. App. 458 (1st Dist.
1913).
50 Bash v. Hill, 62 Ill. 216 (1871) (notice not given); Nicholson v. Alderson, supra
note 48 (proper notice given). Notice is not necessary where the agency is revoked by the
death of the principal. Hunt v. Judd, supra note 47.
51 Day v. Porter, discussed infra at note 83; see generally, Annot., 27 A.L.R2d 1348,
1353, 1395 (1953).
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courts will apply the more liberal view when there is revocation,
providing the proper circumstances exist. Thus, a number of cases
have held the principal liable where the broker was engaged in
active negotiations with a prospective purchaser at the time of
revocation and sale was subsequently made to that purchaser.52
This is clearly an application of the liberal view advocated by the
Owens case.
In Schuster v. Martin5 3 the broker was engaged to sell or ex-
change an eighty acre tract, with no time limit set. The principal
discharged the broker from further employment approximately
two months prior to an exchange of deeds with the broker's pros-
pect. At that time, the prospect was not ready, willing, and able to
trade. The court, in allowing recovery of the commission, empha-
sized the fact that negotiations had been continuous from the time
when the broker had introduced the prospect to the principal
(before termination of the agency), until the sale was consummated.
In another Illinois case, Gleason v. McKay,' the court held
that "[t]he principal cannot, while in the very midst of a negotia-
tion which the efforts of the agent [have] set in motion, and which
results in a sale of the property, withdraw the agency from the
broker and thereby deprive him of his commission. '55
Some courts have permitted the recovery of commissions by
upholding the general proposition that brokerage contracts are
unilateral and can therefore be revoked at anytime prior to accept-
ance, but also holding that partial performance by the broker
constitutes acceptance of the contract.
An interesting conflict has become apparent in the First and
Second Appellate Districts in Illinois regarding the power of the
principal to revoke an agency given for a definite period of time.
The theory of one appellate court is that the unilateral offer be-
52 Schuster v. Martin, 45 Ill. App. 481 (2d Dist. 1892); Gleason v. McKay, 37 Ill. App.
464 (lst Dist. 1890). See also, Dancy v. Baker, 206 Ala. 236, 238, 89 So. 590, 592 (1921)
(dictum); Maddox v. Harding, 91 Neb. 292, 135 N.W. 1019 (1912).
53 Supra note 52.
54 Supra note 52.
55 Id. at 464 and 465. In both the Schuster and Gleason cases, it appears that the
court could have applied the estoppel or implied waiver theories espoused in Everson v.
Phelps, 104 Ore. 288, 206 Pac. 306 (1922), to produce the same results. Indeed, this ap-
plication would have been much more beneficial from the standpoint of sound juris-
prudence. See discussion in note 26 supra.
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comes irrevocable, under ordinary contract principles, after there
has been part performance by the broker. The other theory is that
an ordinary brokerage contract is a unilateral offer containing a
number of conditions to be met before the broker is entitled to his
commission, and therefore, this unilateral offer can be revoked at
anytime before it is accepted by meeting all of the conditions
set forth in the contract.
The leading appellate case advocating the irrevocability of a
listing for a definite period of time after performance has begun
is Schwartz v. Akerlund.56 The brokerage contract in this case con-
tained promises by the agent to advertise and show the property
without expense to the principal. The broker, Schwartz, showed
the property to prospective purchasers on several occasions and ad-
vertised the property for sale a number of times in a newspaper.
Then, nine days before Schwartz's thirty-day exclusive agency was
to expire, the principal contracted to sell the property to Goodkin
through another broker, Lapin. This sale was consummated and
Lapin was given a commission. The principal contended that the
sale of the property automatically revoked his unilateral offer to
Schwartz. In holding that Schwartz was entitled to his full com-
mission, the court stated:
A mere offer is not a contract, but when the offeree pursuant
to the offer has done some work and spent some money, which in
and of themselves constitute some consideration, may it be said
that the offer has been transmuted into a binding promise and
become[s] part of the contract between the parties, even though the
offeree has only partly performed the consideration provided for
in the offer? In a note to section 2452 (p. 2059) Mechem on Agency,
2d ed. vol. 2, the subject is discussed quite at large. In our judg-
ment, speaking generally, such an offer is irrevocably accepted by
the first unequivocal act which may be said to constitute something
in the nature of substantial consideration; otherwise the law would
permit the capricious withdrawal of an offer when the considera-
tion was all but completed and deprive the offeree of a remedy even
for what he had done. We are of the opinion, therefore, that there
was a binding contract.57
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Schwartz case,
thus making the decision permitting recovery by the broker final.58
56 240 Ill. App. 480 (lst Dist. 1926). This is the most recent brokerage contract case
in the 1st District involving a problem comparable to the one under discussion.
57 Id. at 484. Apparently, the 1st Appellate District Court had made a similar hold-
ing in Hanlon v. Dunne, 189 Ill. App. 123 (lst Dist. 1914).
58 Schwartz v. Akerlund, 241 Ill. App. XXXVIII (1st Dist. 1926).
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The decision in Schwartz is supported by basic contract law.
Under modern contract principles, when the offeree of a unilateral
contract undertakes part performance to such an extent that it
causes him to be bound, then mutuality of obligation is provided.
Such part performance is sufficient to bind the offeror and make
the contract irrevocable.59
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify this area back in
1888 in Plumb v. Campbell.6" It made the following statement:
On these authorities, it is clear that appellant [the offeror]
could be bound, under this writing, in either of three ways: First,
by appellee [the offeree] engaging, within a reasonable time, to
perform the contract on his part; second, by beginning such per-
formance in a way which would bind him to complete it; and,
third, by actual performance. 61 (Emphasis added.)
The holding in this case was based upon "actual performance." It
is interesting to note that there are three other First District cases,
besides Schwartz, which support the modern contract principle set
forth in Plumb.62
In addition, many fine authors have found merit with the
modern rule utilized in the Schwartz case, although their theories
are varied.63 There is good reason to believe that the Supreme
Court of Illinois will hold in accord with this view when the next
opportunity arises.
Courts which uphold the strict view of revocation do so by
advocating that a unilateral brokerage contract can be revoked at
59 1 Corbin, Contracts § 154 (1950); Restatement, Contracts § 45 (1932).
60 Plumb v. Campbell, 101 Ill. 101 (1888).
61 Id. at 107.
62 See Kling Bros. Engineering Works v. Whiting Corp., 320 Ill. App. 630, 51
N.E.2d 1004 (1st Dist. 1943); Central Guarantee Co. v. Fourth & Central Trust Co., 244
Ill. App. 61 (1st Dist. 1927); Alexander Hamilton Institute v. Jones, 234 Ill. App. 444
(1st Dist. 1924).
63 (1) An implied promise to keep the offer open which is accepted by starting the
requested performance: Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 Yale L.J. 169 (1917); Kratovil, Real Estate Law, 112-15 (3d ed. 1958).
(2) Promissory estoppel: Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other than a Promise,
23 Harv. L. Rev. 159 (1910). (3) Commencement of performance is acceptance and binding
on the offeror: Book Review, 28 L.Q. Rev. 100 (1912). (4) Offeror becomes bound on a
contract from the time performance began on it, but liability thereon is conditional upon
complete performance: Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by
Partial Performance of Service Requested, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 94 (1921). See generally
Comment, 28 111. B.J. 239, 241 and n.20 (1940). See also Restatement, Contracts § 45
(1932).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
anytime prior to the fulfillment of all the conditions set forth in
the contract-including the sale itself. The leading case favoring
strict revocation is Nicholson v. A lderson.64 In that case the broker
contracted for a ninety day exclusive agency promising "to sell or
exchange the real estate described therein and to advertise and
show the property without expense. ' ' 6' The principal revoked the
agency thirty-three days later, after the broker had begun to per-
form the acts required of him. Denying the recovery of a commis-
sion, the court flatly rejected the broker's contention that this was
an executory contract which became irrevocable when he began
performance.
In reaching this conclusion the Second District court not only
completely neglected a previous Second District case reaching a
contra result,66 but it also relied on a clearly distinguishable First
District case.," The court then proceeded to summarily distinguish
all cases contra including the Schwartz case. 68  However, the
Schwartz case was distinguished erroneously. The court in Nichol-
son said that there was no revocation in Schwartz since the contract
called for a written revocation, but the court in Schwartz actually
held otherwise. As previously stated, the sale of the property by the
owner or by another broker revokes the agencies of all brokers
immediately. 69 Therefore, although the attempted oral revocation
in Schwartz might be invalid because a written revocation was re-
quired by the contract, the sale through another broker would be a
revocation by law; however, in law, the contract was held irrevo-
64 347 111. App. 496, 107 N.E.2d 39 (2d Dist. 1952).
65 Id. at 497, 107 N.E.2d at 40.
66 Goodmanson v. Rosenstein, 144 Ill. 243 (2d Dist. 1908). This case uses very broad
language in granting a full commission under the theory of general assumpsit; the facts
are strikingly similar.
67 Goetz v. Ochala, 180 Ill. App. 458 (1st Dist. 1913). This case sounded in general
assumpsit; recovery was denied because the court found no evidence upon which to base
a quantum meruit recovery, but indicated via dicta that it would have permitted such
a recovery since there were beneficial services to the owner. The court held that the
exclusive agency was revocable; however, this case should have been distinguished from
the Nicholson case on the basis that the contract here did not call for specific services
by the broker.
In another early 1st District case, the court specifically rejected the view that per-
formance of services by the broker makes an exclusive sixty day agency contract irrevocable.
Here again, however, there was no promise by the broker to provide specific services in
the contract. Also, the court indicated that a quantum meruit recovery could be won
upon proof of a sum certain. Pretzel v. Anderson, 162 Ill. App. 538 (lst Dist. 1911).
68 Schwartz v. Akerlund, 240 111. App. 48 (1st Dist. 1926). See text accompanying note
55 supra.
69 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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cable because of the broker's partial performance. Thus, it is sub-
mitted that the Nicholson case was incorrectly decided.
Some of the older cases have favored the broker by distinguish-
ing between the power to revoke and the right to revoke. These
cases state that while the principal has the power to revoke, he does
not have the right to do so without liability for damages incurred
by the agent. 70 This extreme view ignores the fact that an ordinary
brokerage contract is unilateral and construes it as if it were a
bilateral contract. 71
If, after revocation by the principal, the court is willing to
provide the broker with a remedy by applying any of the theories
discussed above, then damages will be given to the broker. The
damages collectable under present views in the revocation area
seem to fall into three major groups: 72 (1) The agreed rate of com-
pensation under the part performance view utilized in the Schwartz
case; (2) a reasonable sum based on quantum meruit where services
have been partially performed; and (3) the payment of no more
damages than the actual circumstances permit in a particular case,
as advocated in Pretzel v. Anderson. Where the court finds that
the revocation is a result of bad faith on the part of the principal,
the amount of damages awarded is usually the agreed rate of
compensation.74
WAIVER OR BAD FAITH BY OWNER
Although the broker has not produced a purchaser within the
time specified by the contract, he may be able to collect his com-
70 Harrison v. Augerson, 115 Ill. App. 226 (2d Dist. 1904). In this case the agreement
provided that the property would be left with the broker for sale during a one month
period. Shortly thereafter, the broker began negotiations with a prospect. Only a few
hours before the broker's prospect became ready, willing, and able to buy, the principal with-
drew the property from the market. The court held that the broker was entitled to full
commission. Accord, Hancock v. Stacy, 103 Tex. 219, 125 S.W. 884 (1910).
71 It is submitted that this view not only plays havoc with basic contract law, but it
also produces an unjust result. It should be noted that in this case no sale took place;
therefore, even the most liberal view advocated by the Owens case would not have
permitted recovery. See text accompanying note 22 supra. The only worthwhile explana-
tion for this holding is suggested by the facts; the circumstances surrounding the revoca-
tion are tantamount to a bad faith repudiation.
72 For an excellent discussion, see 31 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 180 (1953).
73 Supra note 67.
74 Day v. Porter, 60 Ill. App. 381 (1st Dist. 1895), aff'd, 161 Ill. 235, 43 N.E. 1023 (1896);
see generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1357-61 (1953).
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mission if the principal by his actions waived the time limitation
of the contract, or if he was prevented from carrying out his part
of the agreement by the fault, fraud or bad faith by the owner.
Waiver
The time limitation imposed upon brokers in their contracts
of employment are ordinarily "of the essence" in the contract, 7
but the owner may by his conduct waive such a limitation and be-
come liable to a broker who finds a purchaser after the time has
elapsed. 7 Waiver is commonly found where the principal know-
ingly permits the agent to continue to expend his time and money
negotiating after the expiration date or after revocation. The
owner will not be permitted in such circumstances to appropriate
the efforts of the agent without compensating him for his services. 7
In an early Illinois case, 78 for example, the broker concluded
a sale several days after the expiration of his authority. The princi-
pal had continually urged the plaintiff on during this period, in-
quired regularly of the progress being made, and on the day of
the sale had sent a messenger to represent his interests and to
collect any payments that might be made at the time. These facts
led to the conclusion that the time limitation was waived by the
parties, and the broker recovered a commission.79
75 Barney v. Yazoo Delta Land Co., 179 Ind. 337, 345, 101 N.E. 96, 99 (1912).
76 See generally 8 Am. Jur. Brokers § 171 (1938).
77 Stiewal v. Lally, 89 Ark. 195, 115 S.W. 1134 (1909); Moore v. Borgfeldt, 96 Cal. App.
306, 273 Pac. 114 (1929); Frost v. Thompson, 18 Ill. App. 410 (1st Dist. 1886); Holbrook-
Blackwelder Real Estate & Trust Co. v. Hartman, 128 Mo. App. 228, 106 S.W. 115 (1908);
Moran v. Bair, 394 Pa. 471, 156 At. 81 (1931).
78 Frost v. Thompson, supra note 77. Where a broker, authorized to act for sixty
days, started negotiations with a prospective purchaser which continued past the specified
date, and the principal knew of the scope of the negotiations but said nothing, he was
held to have waived the time limit. Moran v. Bair, supra note 77.
79 Accord, Stiewal v. Lally, supra /note 77. The owner was informed of the negotia-
tions by the broker and continued to furnish information when requested, without ob-
jection. The court stated:
[A] party to a contract containing a limitation as to time for performance who
induces the other party after the expiration of the time limit to continue in the
performance of the contract will not be permitted to withhold the fruits of the
contract because it was not performed within the specified time. 89 Ark. at 204,
115 S.W. at 1138.
Contra, Rutherford v. Mancuso, 180 Md. 628, 25 A.2d 374 (1942). The agent's authority
was revoked, effective February 13. On that date, the agent brought two couples out to
see the property and was permitted to show them around. Sale was made to these persons




If the agent is prevented from full performance by the owner's
fault, fraud, or bad faith, recovery of a commission will be allowed
for a sale made after the dissolution of his authority.80 The ques-
tion of bad faith commonly arises where the owner has revoked
the broker's authority or made the sale through other means when
the broker had accomplished all that he was to have undertaken or
when he was plainly approaching success. 81 Bad faith in such cases
has been defined as a purpose on the part of the owner to obtain a
profit from the broker's exertions without paying for them."
In Day v. Porter,8 3 the plaintiff secured an offer from Corneau
to purchase the defendant's land for $35,000. This was declined,
as was an offer of $40,000. Although the owner stated that he
wanted $45,000, an offer for that amount was refused and he in-
creased his asking price to $50,000. The owner then learned the
name of the offeror, terminated the agency, and sold the land to
Corneau for $50,000. It was held that this evidence warranted a
finding that the agency was terminated for the purpose of avoiding
a commission. The court said:
The principal cannot, when the broker's efforts have resulted
in negotiations for a sale and the expected customer still has the
matter under consideration, step in, and, taking up the unbroken
thread by which the broker and customer are connected, weave it
into a completed fabric and escape liability for the work of his
agent he has turned to profit.8 4
80 Dunn v. Snell, 124 Neb. 560, 247 N.W. 428 (1933); Ramezzano v. Avansino, 44
Nev. 72, 189 Pac. 681 (1920); see generally 8 Am. Jur. Brokers § 141 (1938). A good example
of fault by the owner not involving bad faith or fraud is Hunter v. Gales, 227 Ill. App.
105 (3d Dist. 1922), wherein the principal was unable to effectuate a sale to the agent's
ready, willing, and able prospect because he could not pass good title; the principal's
wife refused to sign the deed.
81 Sherman v. Briggs Realty Co., 310 Mass. 408, 38 N.E.2d 637 (1941).
82 Kacavas v. Diamond, 303 Mass. 88, 29 N.E.2d 936 (1939). In Pate v. Marsh, 65 Ill.
App. 482 (2d Dist. 1895), the owner sent a letter to a prospect with whom the agent was
dealing which stated: "A real estate man has been trying to work a good commission out
of it, but I told him it was not for sale. There is no use of one paying $50 to make a
trade, consequently if you buy, you can trade with me." Held: the owner could not
rescind the contract under such circumstances and appropriate the broker's labors. Good
faith required that he allow the broker to complete the sale he had started.
88 60 Ill. App. 381 (1st Dist. 1895), afl'd, 161 Ill. 235, 43 N.E. 1023 (1896).
84 Id. at 389. Accord, Dunn v. Snell, supra note 80. The court here agreed with the
trial court and permitted the broker to recover his commission after an exchange of
properties between his prospect and the principal. The principal had signed a contract
of exchange, but the prospect refused to sign. Then, after the principal had interviewed
the prospect, the principal showed unusual diligence in getting back his exchange con-
tract. When the exchange was -made shortly thereafter, through another broker, the
NOTES AND COMMENTS
However, the mere fact that the owner, after the revocation of the
broker's authority, accepts the offer which he had refused during
that period is not, of itself, conclusive evidence of bad faith. s5
Circumstances which strongly indicate a bad faith revocation
by the principal are: (1) where the principal sells to the broker's
prospect within a short period of time (generally within one year)
after the revocation;86 and (2) where the difference between the
sale price and the price asked by the broker is only a slight amount
(usually the amount of the broker's commission),. 7
EFFECT OF PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
This section is for the purpose of illustrating the construction
which the courts have given to particular contracts where the
agent's right to a commission on a sale consummated after the
termination of the agency is under consideration." Thus, sugges-
tions for drafting agency contracts will be provided. The references
in this section will be made to general source material.8 9
first broker brought this suit and recovered his commission. The court held that: "[T]he
broker's contract was not revoked in good faith, but was cancelled so that the defendant
could appropriate the broker's services without compensation." Id. at 562, 247 N.W. 428,
429.
85 Uphoff v. Ulrich, 2 111. App. 399 (1st Dist. 1878); Loxely v. Studebaker, 75 N.J.L.
599, 68 At. 98 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907). In Havens v. Irvine, 61 Wyo. 309, 157 P.2d 570
(1945), the broker carried on negotiations with a prospect who was willing to buy
if he could get better terms. The owner, who knew of the interest of the prospect, told
the plaintiff that he was withdrawing the property from sale. The following day, he
sold the ranch to the prospect through the help of a friend. Such circumstances were
held not to indicate bad faith. Contra, Snmith v. Anderson, 2 Idaho 537, 21 Pac. 412 (1889).
The principal sold to the broker's prospect about one month after the revocation. The
court said:
... [C]onsidering the fact that the defendants stated in their letter of revocation
that they did not desire to sell the ranch, yet, in the very teeth of that statement,
proceeded to sell, and to the very person to whom the plaintiff had introduced
them. ... These defendants should not be permitted by their own act to deprive
the plaintiff of his lawful commissions, and, the case having been submitted to
the jury upon the whole evidence, and the jury having found a verdict for the
plaintiff, we do not deem it proper, under the circumstances, to interfere with
that verdict. Id. at 539-40, 21 Pac. 412-13.
86 Howard v. Street, 125 Md. 289, 93 Atl. 923 (1915) (sale made nine months after
termination); Studt v. Leiwicke, 100 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. App. 1937) (one week).
87 Shannon v. Garr, 233 Iowa 38, 6 N.W.2d 304 (1942); 2 Restatement (Second), Agency
§ 454 (1958). See Axsom v. Thompson, 239 Mo. App. 732, 197 S.W.2d 326 (St. Louis Ct.
App. 1946).
88 In Hunt v. Judd, 225 Ill. App. 395 (3d Dist. 1922), the court states in dictum that
where the language of the brokerage contract is unambiguous in its terms, it must be
strictly interpreted according to those terms.
89 This method will make it possible for practical suggestions to be made without
placing the burden of pondering extraneous detail upon the reader. The most enlighten-
ing source of practical suggestions regarding brokerage contracts discovered by this
author is Robert Kratovil's book, Real Estate Law (3d ed. 1958).
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Where a brokerage contract provides that the agent will be
entitled to his commission if the property is sold to any prospect
with whom he "has negotiated," the agent will be able to recover
his commission after the termination of his contract upon sale to
the prospect.9 0 Under such a contract, the agent can recover even
though he is not the procuring cause of the sale regardless of who
has procured the purchaser.9 1 However, some courts have held that
the agent must have at least contributed to the consummation of
the sale.9 2 Most contracts of this type limit the period of time for
which this stipulation is effective; where no definite time period
is stated in the contract, the sale must be a reasonable time after the
termination of the agency.93
If an agent wishes to bind the principal for the period speci-
fied in the contract, he should provide in the contract that he will
do something specific" as was done in the Schwartz case. 5 This
will make the contract irrevocable upon part performance by the
agent. In discussing this suggestion, Kratovil states:
Many listing contracts contain vague, general statements such
as "in consideration of the broker's best efforts to sell the property,"
the owner will pay a commission. These . . . [general statements
will not result in irrevocable unilateral] contracts. The broker
must promise to do something specific .... Let the listing contract
provide "broker agrees to publish an advertisement of the prop-
erty at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county." The listing should be signed by the broker, though this
may be done after the landowner has signed the listing and left the
broker's office. This listing is irrevocable from the date it is signed,
9o Kratovil, id. at 108. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1408-17 (1953). Kratovil
points out in his book that:
Courts are unfriendly to these provisions for automatic extension of the
listing period. Even if the listing contract is an exclusive agency or exclusive
right to sell, it will be considered an open listing during the extended period
if it is at all ambiguous. When a listing stated it was to be "sole and exclusive
for three months and thereafter until 60 days written notice had been given," it
was exclusive only for the initial period of three months. Thereafter it was only
an open listing. Boggess Realty Co. v. Miller, 227 Ky. 813, 14 S.W.2d 140, 27
A.L.R.2d 1420; Wilson v. Franklin, 282 Pa. 189, 127 At. 609. Kratovil, op. cit.
supra note 89, at 111; see generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1419-24 (1953).
91 See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1408-12 (1953); 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers
§ 220 (1964).
92 See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1348, 1412-15 (1953); 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers
§ 220 (1964).
98 Messick v. Powell, 314 Ky. 805, 236 S.W.2d 897 (1951); 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers
§ 220 (1964).
94 Kratovil, op. cit. supra note 89, at 112-13.
95 Schwartz v. Akerlund, 240 Ill. App. 480 (1st Dist. 1926). See text accompanying
note 56 supra.
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assuming, of course, that the broker advertises that property as
agreed.96
From the principal's point of view, if the contract provides
that the payment of a commission is conditional upon the procure-
ment of a purchaser at a fixed price within a definite period of
time, or apparently, conditional only upon the procurement of a
buyer within a definite period, it is a "special contract. ' 97 There-
fore, under this provision, the broker would not be permitted to
recover his commission unless the condition was fulfilled.98 This
special contract provision makes performance within the contract
period an absolute requirement. Such an arrangement would seem
to be advantageous to the principal.
"Option" contracts given to a broker are treated the same as
all option contracts. It is usually stipulated in these option agree-
ments that in the event of a sale to the broker, his customer, or his
assignee, the broker will receive a commission. Recovery of a com-
mission is denied unless the sale is consummated within the option
period.9
CONCLUSION
Brokerage law is a hybrid of cause and effect, the danger of
unjust forfeiture, a requirement of good faith, and the enforce-
ment of specific contract provisions. A delicate balance must be
maintained between these elements. The courts have done a lauda-
ble job, indeed, in maintaining a proper balance. For instance,
Illinois courts apparently have refused to apply the liberal view
in all instances except where revocation by the principal exists.
This division and application has resulted in justice for both the
principal and the agent. In expiration of time cases, the Illinois
courts have held for the principal by applying the general rule,10
and thus basic contract principles have not been violated. On the
other hand, where there has been a revocation by the principal
and part performance by the broker, the courts have held for the
98 Kratovil, Real Estate Law 112 (3d ed. 1958).
97 See discussion in notes 13 and 16 supra.
98 Ibid.
99 See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R2d 1348, 1417-19 (1953).
100 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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broker by utilizing the liberal view..' or by holding the unilateral
offer irrevocable under modern contract principles. 0 2
It cannot be said, however, that the Illinois courts have pro-
vided "flawless" justice in the area discussed herein. Where the
agency is for a definite period, and termination has been caused by
revocation within that period, the court should not follow the
Nicholson case. 03 An unjust forfeiture by the broker can be pre-
vented by holding that the contract is binding upon the principal
if the agent was required to perform specific acts and has done so.
On the other hand, the power vis-&-vis the right to revoke theory
should be discarded entirely. This theory will cause unjust results
if applied consistently because the broker will be permitted to re-
cover his commission even though no sale has been consummated
between the principal and the broker's prospect. 04
It is submitted that the theory used in the liberal view (com-
monly characterized as the "procuring cause" theory) is much more
effective. This theory prevents the injustice toward the principal
which is caused by the power vis-a-vis the right to revoke theory,
and yet it provides justice for a broker by permitting his recovery
where he actually procured the sale. However, this "procuring
cause" theory must always be applied with extreme caution. Other-
wise, valid and binding contract rights might become worthless
in cases where the principal has adequately provided for his own
protection by the terms of the brokerage contract.
Some authors have complained that the area discussed herein
has been so fraught with conflict and confusion that it defies analy-
sis. Such a statement does no more than increase the possibility of
conflict and confusion. With careful analysis, every case can be
fitted into the complex "jig-saw puzzle" created, out of necessity,
by the courts.
L. STANTON DOTSON
101 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
102 See notes 56-62 supra and accompanying text.
103 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
104 See discussion in note 71 supra.
